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Abstract 
This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O 
insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive 
conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and 
find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent 
of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented 
in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance 
decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local 
government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative 
wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related 
to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the 
breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible 
perceived securities litigation risk in China. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates why some listed Chinese companies recently considered the 
purchase of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (since 2000) (hereafter referred to as 
“D&O insurance”). In particular, we explore the effect of China’s concentrated ownership 
structure on D&O insurance decisions and test whether the purchase of D&O insurance is 
related to litigation risks arising from the incentive conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority investors. This is an issue not hitherto examined by prior D&O insurance 
studies conducted in jurisdictions such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) where the ownership structure is dispersed and owner-manager agency incentive 
conflicts are a major agency problem.   
D&O insurance is purchased by a company to cover all directors and managers for legal 
liability arising from their professional activities on behalf of the company and its use is 
common for listed companies in common-law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the US and the 
UK.1 D&O insurance is an important corporate governance issue because it may change the 
liability risk profile of company directors and managers and thereby affect their incentives in 
business decisions. Core (1997) argues that demand for D&O insurance may arise from three 
main sources: a) the demand for personal coverage by risk-averse directors; b) the demand 
for D&O corporate coverage arising from an efficient corporate insurance decision (and 
thereby it mirrors the determinants of other insurance purchases);2 and c) the demand for 
D&O insurance arising from managerial entrenchment. While there has been a longstanding 
                                                        
1 A typical D&O policy provides both corporate and personal coverage. The former reimburses the company 
when it indemnifies directors or officers for legal costs or compensation payments awarded against them. The 
latter provides direct payment to directors or officers when the company is not able to indemnify them for legal 
reasons or due to financial distress. Traditionally, D&O insurers will pay claims arising from shareholder suits if 
the directors and officers have acted honestly and in good faith. As long as the directors and officers do not 
admit to dishonesty, however, insurance coverage may be retained (Ferris et al., 2007).  
2 Mayers and Smith (1982), among others, theorize that in a world with frictions (e.g., bankruptcy costs, 
contracting costs, and taxes), ownership structure, leverage, firm size, growth opportunities, managerial 
compensation, tax and regulatory status are important determinants of corporate use of insurance. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652174
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interest in understanding the determinants of corporate use of D&O insurance, the number of 
empirical studies has been limited due to the difficulty in obtaining D&O insurance data.  
Three studies (Core, 1997; O’Sullivan, 1997; Chalmers et al., 2002) have investigated 
the use of D&O insurance in Canada, the UK and the US, respectively. For example, Core 
(1997) examined 222 Canadian companies in 1993 and found some support for all the three 
sources of D&O insurance demand mentioned above. Using a sample of London-listed 
companies in 1991, O’Sullivan (1997) found that large companies with a higher proportion of 
outside directors and a lower level of managerial share ownership were more likely to 
purchase D&O insurance. Using a sample of 72 IPOs in the US, Chalmers et al. (2002) found 
that the three-year post-IPO stock returns are negatively related to the amount of D&O 
insurance purchased at the time of the IPO. They conclude that managerial self-interest plays 
a key role in D&O insurance decisions, as managers seemed to have incorporated their 
private information regarding the overpricing of the IPO (and thereby the litigation risks 
induced by subsequent price decreases) in D&O insurance decisions.  
These studies share two common features. First, they are carried out in litigious 
common-law jurisdictions, and, secondly, they are based on companies with a diffuse 
ownership structure where a major agency problem is related to the incentive conflicts 
between shareholders and managers. As directors and managers in these countries are under 
no obligation to seek shareholders’ approval for purchasing insurance (Core, 1997, p.68), 
directors and managers are more likely to purchase D&O insurance to serve their 
self-interests.  
China – a large and dynamic economy with a unique institutional background – now 
provides a good opportunity for us to further test and/or refine the above theories on D&O 
insurance purchases that were primarily developed in western countries. China serves as an 
interesting setting for the current study for at least two reasons.  
 3
First, China’s listed firms have a concentrated ownership structure that is often 
dominated by a large (state-owned) shareholder. According to recent “law and finance” 
literature, a central agency problem under a concentrated ownership structure is the 
expropriation of minority interests by controlling shareholders. The conflicts of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders are further exacerbated in China because the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is also split into non-tradable shares held by 
controlling shareholders and tradable shares held by minority shareholders (though both types 
of shares have the same cash flow and voting rights). This unique split share structure can 
lead to divergent interests between tradable and non-tradable shareholders and has long been 
recognized as the source of many corporate governance problems (e.g., financial frauds and 
tunneling) in China. As a result, managers/directors of listed companies are often involved in 
helping the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby facing 
litigation risks. Whether or not the purchase of D&O insurance is related to the incentive 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and expropriation-related litigation 
risks is a question that cannot be effectively answered by studies focusing on countries where 
companies have a diffuse ownership structure. Our investigation is possible because directors 
and managers in China are required by the CSRC to seek the approval of shareholders’ 
meetings for the purchase of D&O insurance. Therefore, any observed D&O insurance 
approval by shareholders’ meetings in China can be assumed to be in line with the interests of 
controlling shareholders because otherwise they can veto the proposed purchase. Therefore, 
D&O insurance decisions in China are more likely to be dictated by controlling shareholders’ 
interests rather than by managerial entrenchment. 
Second, as we explain in detail in Section 2, although recent legal reforms mean that 
private securities litigation (PSL) against listed companies and their directors and managers is 
now possible in China, it has yet to be seen how the relevant judicial agencies will apply the 
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new laws. Indeed, Chen (2003) reports that very few cases brought to the Chinese courts have 
been settled in favor of defrauded investors. As a result, the risk of litigation in China that 
exists in principle may appear less real in practice. Therefore, investigating the purchase of 
D&O insurance also provides an opportunity to evaluate whether or not the recent changes to 
the legal codes that aimed to strengthen investor protection have had any noticeable effect on 
managerial behaviors in China. This is clearly of interest to both policymakers and investors 
(including international investors).  
We hypothesize that firms with more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentive 
conflicts are more likely to consider purchasing D&O insurance than other firms. Using a 
sample of 53 first-time approvals of the purchase of D&O insurance by shareholders’ 
meetings over the period 2000 through 2004 and a matched control sample, we find support 
for the hypothesis. For example, firms with more board seats occupied by representatives of 
large shareholders, engaging in earnings management, and/or more tunneling related-party 
transactions (RPTs) are more likely to seek D&O insurance coverage. These results suggest 
that D&O insurance can be opportunistically purchased to protect controlling shareholders 
and their agents (company directors and managers) against the litigation risks arising from 
the expropriation of minority interests. Using an event study, we found that the 
announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, 
and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to 
tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. We believe that the above evidence constitutes 
a useful extension to the D&O insurance literature. Since concentrated ownership structures 
are common in many countries around the world, and particularly in East Asia (Claessens et 
al., 2000), our results also have implications for these economies. Ferris et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater 
propensity to (owner-management) agency conflicts. Our study complements theirs in that we 
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show that firms with a greater propensity to controlling-minority shareholder agency conflicts 
are associated with a higher (perceived) risk of litigation.   
In addition, we found that the incidence of the decision to take out D&O insurance is 
positively related to the proportion of independent directors on the board and to some 
litigation risk proxies (e.g., prior record of law violation, leverage, the number of 
shareholders, and the proportion of foreign investors). Interestingly, these results (from a 
country where the legal and political environment is still not conducive to PSL) are 
comparable to the findings of prior D&O insurance studies conducted in jurisdictions with 
litigious common-law traditions. One explanation is that the recent breakthrough in corporate 
governance and legal reforms seem to have created a non-negligible level of perceived 
securities litigation risk in China.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional 
background and formulates the research hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design, 
including the model and variables used, and data description. Section 4 discusses the findings 
and the results of sensitivity tests, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development   
2.1. The emergence of PSL in China 
China’s stock market was developed within a weak legal framework that offered 
shareholders little protection. During the early 2000s, China’s stock market was riddled with 
outbreaks of corporate scandals. Common to these scandals was that the interests of minority 
shareholders (often individuals) were seriously infringed upon by the controlling shareholders 
(often a state-owned enterprise (SOE)). Realizing that many of these scandals had stemmed 
from the weak legal protection for investors, China launched several corporate governance 
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and legal reforms which led to the emergence of PSL in China. Figure 1 provides a timeline 
of the evolution of PSL and the emerging civil liabilities of company directors and managers.  
 
One key reform was the introduction of the independent director system under which 
independent directors are required to express opinions on the fairness of important corporate 
decisions to minority shareholders, e.g., relating to financial reporting and RPTs. The 
independent director system was formalized by the CSRC Regulations (2001, 2002), which 
require listed firms to have at least one third of their board members as independent directors 
by June 30, 2003. The CSRC regulations also permit listed firms to purchase liability 
insurance for independent and other directors subject to approval at the shareholders’ 
meetings. These CSRC Regulations served as a catalyst for the development of D&O 
insurance in China and the first D&O insurance policy was introduced to the market in 
January 2002 by Ping An Insurance. Other insurers (e.g., the American Insurance Group 
(AIG) and the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC)) quickly followed suit.  
On the other hand, investors had been responding to corporate scandals by attempting to 
seek civil compensation since 1998 when the first PSL case was brought against Hongguang 
Industrial. Chen (2003) reported that more than 2,000 lawsuits had been filed nationwide 
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against some 20 listed companies (pending court judgment) in China.3  However, the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) had taken a cautious attitude towards the growing number of 
securities lawsuits being filed.4 On September 21, 2001, the SPC temporarily prohibited 
lower courts from accepting PSL cases on ground that the legislative and judicial conditions 
were not ripe for hearing such cases. Pressured by mounting criticism from lawyers, 
academics and investors, the SPC issued another notice on January 15, 2002 allowing lower 
courts to accept PSL cases relating to false disclosures. On January 9, 2003, the SPC issued 
another circular setting out detailed rules on the handling of false disclosure related PSL 
cases (hereafter referred to as “the SPC Rules”).5 This represents a breakthrough, allowing 
litigation against false disclosure and recognizing the civil liabilities of company directors 
and managers in China.  
Discussions on amending China’s Company Law (1993) and Securities Law (1998) 
started in 2004 with the aim of strengthening investor protection. The amendment of both 
laws was completed at the end of 2005 and they came into effect on January 1, 2006. Of 
particular interest, Article 148 of the Company Law provides that directors, supervisors and 
managers owe a duty of loyalty and due diligence to the company. Articles 150-153 have, for 
the first time, established the possibility and procedure of statutory derivative lawsuits in 
China and empowered shareholders to take legal action against directors and managers for 
their wrongdoings.6  The new Securities Law (2005) also contains detailed provisions 
                                                        
3 This large number of litigation attempts has arisen because western-type class action suits are not allowed in 
China. This makes securities litigation potentially expensive and time consuming in China. 
4 In China, securities-related cases have invariably resulted in administrative sanctions and/or criminal 
penalties; in contrast, a civil remedy has traditionally been neglected by law (Chen, 2003). 
5 Despite this progress, the SPC Rules were criticized as they contain some barriers for plaintiff investors – 
e.g., the requirement for specific government administrative actions as a prerequisite for any PSL, the lack of a 
western-type class action suit system, the jurisdictional requirement favoring defendants, and the too 
narrowly-defined causal link between false disclosures made by the company and losses suffered by investors 
(e.g., Hutchens, 2003). Hutchens (2003) also opines that China’s approach to PSL reflects the dilemma between 
protecting listed companies in which the state is often the controlling shareholder and protecting minority 
interests. 
6 Article 149 sets out specific examples of disloyalty. Allowing shareholders to bring a derivative lawsuit has 
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regarding the civil liabilities for false corporate disclosure. Therefore, in anticipation of ever 
increasing civil liability lawsuits to be brought under the new laws, company directors and 
managers may have enhanced incentives to seek D&O insurance coverage, particularly in 
companies with a higher (perceived) litigation risk. 
2.2. Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts  
China established the stock market in the early 1990s in order to help revitalize its ailing 
SOEs by providing them with a financing channel and instilling some elements of market 
discipline on top management. As a result, most listed companies are state controlled, with 
only about one-third of company shares sold to private investors by way of IPOs. The other 
two-thirds of shares are either held by government agencies, i.e., the state shares, or held by 
legal entities (often SOEs), i.e., the legal-person shares. Neither state shares nor legal-person 
shares are publicly tradable, but they can be transferred via private negotiations (subject to 
government approval). Shares issued to the public, on the other hand, are tradable and they 
are further divided into A-shares (primarily for domestic individual investors), B-shares 
(primarily for foreign investors) and H-shares (shares traded in overseas markets).7  
Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute in China for two reasons. 
First, the split share structure means that large non-tradable shareholders often have different 
interests from those of minority investors. This is because non-tradable shareholders’ 
interests are not directly affected by changes in market stock prices because of the 
non-tradability of their shares. More importantly, the concentrated ownership structure has 
given non-tradable shareholders tremendous potential to dominate company decisions and 
benefit themselves at the expense of minority interests.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
been acclaimed by legal practitioners as greatly improving the private enforcement of law in China. 
7 The Chinese government made the trading of B-shares available to domestic investors in 2001 and the 
trading of A-shares available to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) in 2002. 
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Second, most listed firms in China are spin-offs from SOEs with the parent groups 
serving as their largest shareholders. The process, by which a profitable arm of an SOE is 
carved out, packaged financially and floated creates inherent business and personnel 
connections between the listed firm and the unlisted parent firm and thus further compounds 
the expropriation problems between the controlling and minority shareholders. In many cases, 
the listed firm is expected to channel funds back to support the parent firm’s unprofitable 
(business or non-business) units (Aharony et al., 2005). Many controlling shareholders 
therefore treat the listed firm as a vehicle of fund raising from minority shareholders and 
resource tunneling.8 Expropriation is prevalent also because the relevant laws were not 
developed enough to expose company managers and directors to a high litigation risk and 
thereby the potential penalty before 2000 was small.9   
 In China, controlling shareholders can use two primary vehicles to expropriate minority 
investors. The first is false information disclosure by listed companies in relation to equity 
issues. China has maintained a tight control (via a profitability-oriented screening process) 
over equity issues since the launch of the stock market. The right to equity financing thus 
represents a kind of “luxury” that is only available for a small proportion of companies. Yu et 
al. (2006) identify that some Chinese companies frequently engage in earnings manipulation 
and false financial disclosure in order to meet the CSRC’s profitability requirements and 
secure the right to issue shares. False financial disclosure relating to share issues is now a 
major cause for the pending PSL cases in China.  
The second vehicle for expropriation is through tunneling RPTs (e.g., Aharony et al., 
2005; Cheung et al., 2006). The documented abuses by controlling shareholders in this 
                                                        
8 Non-tradable shareholders typically inject non-cash assets at the time of the IPO, subscribe to new share 
issues with non-cash assets or simply choose not to take up the new issue in seasoned equity offerings. 
9 We thank the suggestion of an anonymous referee and discuss this in detail in Section 2.1. 
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respect include obtaining soft loans from the listed companies;10 using listed companies as 
guarantors for bank loans; and buying and selling goods, services, and assets at unfair prices. 
Such tunneling activities by controlling shareholders represent another major cause for PSL 
cases in China.  
2.3. Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and D&O insurance 
Since listed companies in China are expected to channel resources back to their parent 
companies, company directors and managers in China are often involved in expropriation 
activities and thus face litigation risk. In fact, directors and managers of Hongguang 
Industrial were sued in addition to the listed firm in 1998. More recently, two independent 
directors and managers of Guangdong Kelon were also sued by minority shareholders for 
false information disclosure and inflating profits for the purpose of issuing stocks in 2006. 
Given the existence of litigation risks arising from controlling shareholders’ expropriation 
activities, firms with more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts may 
find it more difficult to hire and retain managers and directors. Managers and directors may 
refuse to collude with controlling shareholders in tunneling activities without insurance 
coverage. Controlling shareholders in these firms are therefore more likely to support the 
purchase of D&O insurance in order to reduce the litigation risks faced by directors and 
managers. We thus hypothesize that firms with more acute controlling-minority shareholder 
incentive conflicts are more likely to consider purchasing D&O insurance than other firms. 
3. Research design 
3.1. The model 
                                                        
10 According to a CSRC survey, as at the end of 2002, 676 companies out of the 1,175 listed companies 
surveyed were found to have money appropriated by controlling shareholders. In 2001, the controlling 
shareholder of Sanjiu Pharmaceutical appropriated RMB2.6 billion, about 96% of the listed firm’s total equity. 
Examples of companies involved in lawsuits related to tunneling RPTs include Sanjiu Pharmaceutical, Lianhua 
Gufen, and Houwang Gufen. 
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To test the above hypothesis, we adopted the following probit model:  
Yit* = f{Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflict proxies it-1, Controlsit-1}+ φit (1) 
Where the latent variable, Yit*, is not observable; its observable counterpart is Yit (INS), 
which is equal to 1 if Yit*>0, denoting a company’s shareholders’ meeting has approved the 
purchase of D&O insurance for the first time; and 0 if Yit* < = 0, denoting that there is no 
such approval. We use approval for purchases rather than actual purchases because data on 
actual purchases are not available from public sources. We discuss in Section 3.4 the 
important advantages of using such a measure. To mitigate potential endogeneity of some 
explanatory variables with respect to the purchase of D&O insurance11, we measure all 
explanatory variables in a one-period lag.  
3.2. Measuring the incentive conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders  
 We include a battery of proxies for the extent of the incentive conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders and discuss them below. Table 1 provides a detailed 
definition and the expected sign of all variables. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The proportion of large shareholder representatives on the board (LARGEREP): Large 
shareholders can control a company’s decision-making by electing representatives (outside 
‘grey’ directors) onto the board. The higher the proportion of grey directors, the greater the 
chance that the board may make decisions at the expense of minority interests, and thereby 
the higher the litigation risks. Therefore, we expect LARGEREP to be positively related to 
the incidence of D&O insurance purchases.  
Earnings Management: False financial disclosure relating to equity issues is now the 
major cause of the pending PSL cases in China. Yu et al. (2006) report pervasive use of 
                                                        
11 The endogeneity issue is not a serious concern in our study because our measure of the dependent variable 
is the approval of D&O insurance rather than the actual purchase. 
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earnings manipulation by listed companies who are at the profitability threshold stipulated by 
the CSRC for rights issues (the threshold is 6% of ROE for our sample period). We therefore 
define an earnings manipulation indicator variable (ROE6_7%) to denote the possibility of 
earnings manipulation and/or fraudulent financial reporting. We expect that firms with more 
acute incentive conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders are more likely to 
manipulate earnings and consider D&O insurance.  
Tunneling RPTs between a listed firm and its large shareholders: Firms with more acute 
incentive conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders are more likely to engage 
in tunneling RPTs. We focused on three types of RPTs that may be used to channel funds 
from a listed firm to its controlling shareholder. First, we included credit guarantees provided 
by a listed firm to its non-tradable shareholders (CREDITG). Credit guarantees represent a 
contingent liability incurred by a listed firm to its non-tradable shareholders and are therefore 
potentially detrimental to the firm’s minority shareholders. Second, as in Aharony et al. 
(2005), we include a firm’s net lending to its non-tradable shareholders (NLEND) to measure 
the amount of money transferred away from the listed firm to its non-tradable shareholders.  
Third, tunneling can also be facilitated by charging favorable prices to non-tradable 
shareholders for the purchases/sales of goods, services and assets between a listed firm and 
its non-tradable shareholders. Unlike NLEND and CREDITG, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether these RPTs are carried out at arm’s length. For example, they can be used by 
non-tradable shareholders to tunnel resources from listed firms, to reduce transaction costs 
within business groups, or to prop up listed firms. As such, prior studies have attempted to 
identify specific conditions under which tunneling is likely to occur. Aharony et al. (2005) 
and Peng et al. (2006) report that controlling shareholders are more likely to tunnel wealth 
away from a listed firm when the firm has just completed an equity issue. 
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We manually collected data on the purchases/sales of goods, services and assets 
(including equity shareholdings) between listed firms and their non-tradable shareholders 
from company annual reports. We aggregated the amount of the purchases/sales of goods and 
services (TGDSV) but treated the amount of asset transactions (including equity 
shareholding) separately (ASSTRAN). This is because the former transactions tend to occur 
on a routine basis, while the latter transactions are one-off events. We define a variable 
ISSUE that equals 1 if there was an equity issue in the previous year, and 0 for otherwise. We 
interact TGDSV and ASSTRAN with ISSUE to denote the possibility of tunneling via RPTs. 
A positively significant coefficient on the two interaction terms would be consistent with the 
argument that listed firms engaging in tunneling RPTs are more likely to seek D&O 
insurance for their directors and managers. However, we note that the trading of goods and 
services and assets transactions in the years following an equity issue are only crude proxies 
for tunneling RPTs. 
3.3. Control variables 
In common with prior studies (e.g., Core, 1997; O’Sullivan, 1997; Chalmers et al., 2002), 
we include various control variables of D&O insurance decisions. Specifically, we include 
the proportion of independent directors (IND) on the board and managerial share ownership 
(MAN) in our model. We expect IND to have a positive sign as risk-averse independent 
directors tend to ask for D&O insurance coverage (Core, 1997; O’Sullivan, 1997); while the 
effect of MAN on D&O insurance is ambiguous.12  
Second, we control for the effect of a firm’s (perceived) litigation risk on D&O insurance 
decisions. Following prior studies, we proxy the potential litigation risk by financial leverage 
(LEV), growth opportunities (GROW), number of shareholders (NUMACC), the proportion 
                                                        
12 No outside independent directors owned shares in our sample. In China, insider ownership (all with voting 
rights) is typically less than 0.01% of total shares in issue and equity option plans are still rare. 
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of shares listed in overseas exchanges (HSHE), the proportion of domestically traded foreign 
shares (i.e., B-shares) (BSHE), and profitability (RROA).13,14 Since the SPC Rules require a 
prior administrative sanction as the prerequisite for initiating a lawsuit against a listed firm. 
We also include a firm’s prior law violation record (VIOREC) as a litigation risk proxy.  
The demand for D&O insurance (corporate coverage) may arise from an efficient 
corporate insurance decision (Core, 1997). In addition to leverage and growth opportunities, 
we also control for firm size, a firm’s regulatory status (REG), and the power of the 
controlling owner (CONTR). Small and regulated firms are more likely to take out insurance 
than other firms (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Firms with a higher value of CONTR means that 
the controlling shareholders’ tunneling is less likely to be challenged by other shareholders, 
leading to a higher demand for insurance coverage. 
Finally, we control for the effect of controlling shareholder identity on D&O insurance 
decisions (LOCASOE and PRIVATE). Listed firms owned by local governments may be 
under pressure to channel funds back to their parent firms that are often left with unprofitable 
units, and in this way, local authorities can achieve political and social objectives (e.g., local 
employment and cross-subsidization) (Cheung et al., 2006). Thus, the litigation risk for listed 
firms controlled by a local government is likely to be higher than that for other firms. 
However, listed firms controlled by a local government may enjoy administrative protection 
provided by the local government, given that the SPC Rules specify that lawsuits against a 
listed firm must be filed where the firm is incorporated (Hutchens, 2003).15   
                                                        
13 We considered using the existence of actual litigation attempts as a direct measure of litigation risk, but the 
lawsuits brought so far are mainly against some 20 listed companies, and only 4 of these sued companies appear 
in our insurance sample. The lack of variation precludes its use as a litigation risk proxy. The reason why some 
companies involved in lawsuits do not appear in our sample could be because they are considered bad risks and 
insurance companies may be reluctant to insure them, or would charge them a prohibitively high insurance 
premium. This also illustrates that using the approval decision data instead of the actual purchase data provides 
a cleaner test for our hypothesis. 
14 We also include audit opinion (coded as 0 if the previous year’s financial statements received a standard 
unqualified opinion and otherwise coded 1) as an alternative risk measure and find it insignificant. 
15 Listed firms often play an important role in the development of the local economy in terms of fund raising, 
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Privately-owned firms may not enjoy the same level of protection from local 
governments as SOEs in the event of a lawsuit and so they are more likely to consider D&O 
insurance than SOEs. However, since private firms often have better corporate governance 
(Cull and Xu, 2005) and are found to be less likely to engage in tunneling RPTs than SOEs 
(Cheung et al., 2006), they may face a lower litigation risk. The above reasoning thus 
indicates that private firms may be less likely to purchase D&O insurance. Overall, the effect 
of private ownership remains an empirical issue.16  
3.4. Construction of the sample 
 As data on actual purchases of D&O insurance are not available from public sources, we 
relied on information concerning the first-time approval of D&O insurance purchases at the 
meetings of shareholders. While this is an unavoidable limitation of our study, it also affords 
us some important advantages. Our primary research purpose was to study whether firms 
experiencing more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts have stronger 
incentives to purchase D&O insurance. Compared with the actual purchase of insurance, a 
decision to purchase insurance represents a cleaner and a more accurate measure of 
controlling shareholders’ incentives. This is because the actual purchase involves not only the 
incentives of controlling shareholders but also the underwriting decisions of insurers. In 
China, the idea of D&O insurance is new and the D&O insurance market is still a seller’s 
market, and as such, it is uncompetitive. As a result, a firm wishing to buy D&O insurance 
may fail to secure coverage because of a prohibitively high rate of premium, or because it 
finds the policy terms and conditions offered by insurers overly restrictive. Focusing on 
                                                                                                                                                                            
generating tax revenue, and providing employment opportunities and so local governments may have incentives 
to protect these listed firms in the event of a lawsuit (Cheung et al., 2006).  
16  We note that given movements towards greater competition and transparency (e.g., via general 
improvement in corporate governance in all firms and via improved audit) in China, both the administrative 
protection that a local government can provide to local SOEs and the difference in the quality of corporate 
governance between SOEs and private firms will diminish over time. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out. 
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companies whose shareholders have approved the purchase of D&O insurance for the first 
time can help minimize the effects of such external factors on our results and also result in a 
larger sample for a more meaningful test of our hypothesis. 
In China, disclosure rules require a listed firm to disclose in public media details of board 
and shareholders’ meetings within two working days following the meetings. Information 
concerning the meetings also must be included in annual reports. As the CSRC requires that 
any purchase of D&O insurance be proposed by the board of directors and approved at the 
shareholders’ meeting, we can find evidence of seeking D&O insurance coverage in the 
annual reports, and the disclosed minutes of board and shareholders’ meetings.  
The sampling period covers the years from 2000 through 2004 because the first attempt 
to seek D&O insurance appeared in China in 2000, and 2004 was the latest year for which the 
full texts of annual reports were available at the time our study was carried out. Our 
comprehensive search identified first-time D&O insurance approvals by 53 firms (about 4% 
of the total number of listed firms as at the end of 2004) (hereafter referred to as the 
“insurance sample”).17 We did not find any case in which a proposal to purchase D&O 
insurance was vetoed by the shareholders’ meeting. This suggests that controlling 
shareholders were supportive of the purchase of D&O insurance. The number of firms with 
the first-time D&O insurance approval in each sample year for the period 2000 to 2004 was 
1, 6, 31, 13, and 2, respectively. While the industry distribution of our insurance sample is 
quite dispersed, industries subject to intense market competition, e.g., machinery (7) and 
metallurgy (6) manufacturing and retail business (5), are more widely represented. 
To carry out our tests we adopted a matched control sample method, which has been 
extensively used in the literature particularly when the size of an event sample is small (e.g., 
D’Mello and Shroff, 2000; Ferris et al., 2007). We matched each observation in the insurance 
                                                        
17 Our event sample, though small, is comparable to Beasley’s (1996) study that uses a sample of 75 
fraudulent firms in examining the relationship between outside directors and financial statement frauds. 
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sample first by industry and year, then by firm size. We chose these matching criteria because 
many firm characteristics, e.g., leverage and profitability, and thereby the potential risk of 
litigation tend to vary according to industry. Firm size is a key determinant in corporate 
insurance decisions (Mayers and Smith, 1982) and it is also positively related to the number 
of shareholders and the amount of foreign investment (proxies for litigation risks) in China. 
Matching by year ensures that an insurance firm and a control firm are subject to the same 
legal and regulatory environment.  
Total assets are used as a proxy for firm size because state and legal-person shares are 
not publicly tradable in China and hence the calculation of the market value of equity can be 
problematic and may affect our matching results. Industry matches are based on the two-digit 
industry code of the 2001 CSRC industry classification.18 Following D’Mello and Shroff 
(2000) and Ferris et al. (2007), we also use an alternative control sample consisting of the two 
closest size-matched firms (in the same industry and year) as a robustness check. 
Unless indicated otherwise, firm-specific accounting, ownership and share price data are 
sourced from the CSMAR Database developed by Shenzhen GTA Ltd and the WIND 
database developed by Shanghai Wind Ltd. Prior violation records, recurring net profit, the 
number of board seats taken by large shareholder representatives, and related-party 
transaction data are all manually extracted from company annual reports.  
4. Results 
4.1. Characteristics of the sample 
Table 2 Panel A lists the descriptive statistics for the variables calculated for the 53 firms 
that approved the purchase of D&O insurance and 53 control firms. Panel B compares the 
                                                        
18 The first two digits of the 2001 CSRC industry classification scheme divide companies into some 40 
industries. Using a more stringent rule (e.g., three digits) would have resulted in many companies in the 
insurance sample remaining unmatched. 
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differences in the metric variables between the insurance and control samples. The results of 
Student t-tests suggest that firms in the insurance sample tend to provide more credit 
guarantees to their large shareholders than firms in the control sample. Albeit generally 
correctly signed, the differences in the other proxies for shareholder incentive conflicts are 
insignificant. The results of the t-tests also indicate that firms in the insurance sample tend to 
have a higher proportion of independent directors on the board, higher leverage, and more 
B-shares than firms in the control sample. There is no significant difference in the mean size 
of the insurance and control samples, suggesting that our matching by firm size worked well.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
The results of the probit model are reported in Table 3.19 Model 1 uses the sample 
consisting of the 53 insurance observations and the 53 control observations. Because the 
value of NLEND is missing for one insurance observation, this observation and its matched 
control observation are dropped from the regression reported under Model 1. We report 
p-values based on standard errors robust to unknown cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Turning to the results of Model 1, the coefficient estimate of LARGEREP is, as expected, 
positive and statistically significant (p<0.05, 1-tail). Thus, corporate boards with greater 
representation by their non-tradable shareholders are more likely to seek D&O insurance 
coverage. This is consistent with the view that firms with more acute controlling-minority 
shareholder incentive conflicts are more likely to consider D&O insurance. Also consistent 
                                                        
19 We include in the regression models a dummy leverage variable (DLEV) as LEV is highly correlated with 
ASSTRAN. DLEV equals 1 if a firm has higher-than-sample-average leverage. We exclude LTA from the 
reported regression models because it is highly correlated with GROW and LNUMACC (with correlation of 
-0.67 and 0.62, respectively) and our matched control sample procedure has exerted an effective control over the 
firm size effect. 
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with our expectation, the coefficient estimate of ROE6_7 is significantly positive (p<0.10, 
1-tail), suggesting that firms that may have engaged in earnings manipulation are more likely 
to consider D&O insurance than other firms. 
Among the measures of tunneling RPTs, the estimates of NLEND and CREDITG are 
positive and statistically significant (p<0.10, 1-tail), suggesting that the more funds are 
appropriated from a listed firm by its non-tradable shareholders and/or the more credit 
guarantees are provided by a listed firm to its non-tradable shareholders, the higher the 
incidence of seeking D&O insurance coverage.  
The estimates of two other measures of tunneling RPTs (TGDSV*ISSUE and 
ASSTRAN*ISSUE) have the expected positive sign but are statistically insignificant. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of TGDSV (p<0.05, 2-tail) indicates that 
when there was no equity issue in the previous or current year (which suggests that a firm 
may need to meet the CSRC’s profitability requirements and apply for an equity issue in the 
future), more purchases/sales of goods and services between the listed firm and its 
non-tradable shareholders lead to a lower chance of attempting D&O insurance. This is 
plausible, as Peng et al. (2006) report that under such circumstances controlling shareholders 
are more likely to prop-up a listed firm via RPTs. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate of 
ASSTRAN is positive and statistically significant (p<0.10, 2-tail). This suggests that even 
when there was no equity issue in the previous year, firms with more asset transactions 
among connected parties, are still more likely to consider D&O insurance than other firms. 
This is possible because asset transactions are often related to mergers and acquisitions and 
so a firm may be more likely to incur civil liabilities from such transactions than from the 
purchases/sales of goods and services. 
The coefficient estimate of IND is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01, 1-tail). 
Therefore, as in O’Sullivan (1997), we find that firms with a higher proportion of 
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independent directors are more likely to consider purchasing D&O insurance – a result that is 
consistent with the risk aversion of independent directors.  
Regarding litigation risk proxies, the estimates of litigation risk proxies VIOREC, DLEV, 
and NUMACC are positive and significant as expected (p<0.10, 1-tail). Therefore, firms with 
a prior violation record, higher leverage, and/or a large number of shareholders are more 
likely to consider D&O insurance than other firms. Our finding with respect to VIOREC 
suggests that listed firms view a prior violation as an important signal of a possible risk of 
litigation against company directors and managers. The positive effect of DLEV on the 
incidence of D&O insurance is consistent with the notion that a firm with 
higher-than-average leverage is likely to have a higher litigation risk than other firms, e.g., 
because such firms may need to undertake more RPTs. This result is also consistent with the 
argument that companies purchase insurance in order to lower the expected costs of financial 
distress (see Mayers and Smith, 1982; Core, 1997).  
The positively significant coefficient estimate of RROA (p<0.10, 2-tail) means that firms 
with high recurring profitability are more likely to consider D&O insurance. Such firms with 
high recurring profitability are more likely to suffer from tunneling by their non-tradable 
shareholders and thereby may face a higher litigation risk than other firms. 
Regarding the identity of controlling shareholders, the coefficient estimates of 
LOCALSOE and PRIVATE are negative and statistically significant (p<0.10, 2-tail), 
implying that listed firms with a local government or a private individual/entity as the 
controlling shareholder are less likely to consider D&O insurance than other firms. It is 
plausible that local protectionism may mitigate the need of D&O insurance in listed firms 
controlled by local governments. A local government may have incentives to exert pressure 
on a local court to rule in favor of a local defendant firm when the local government is the 
firm’s large shareholder. The evidence on PRIVATE is consistent with the argument that 
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private firms are less likely to engage in the expropriation of minority interests because of 
their better corporate governance than SOEs (Cull and Xu, 2005).  
No other variables are found to have a statistically significant impact on the incidence of 
D&O insurance decisions. Finally, the pseudo-R2 of the probit model is about 0.85 and 
therefore, the probit model appears to have reasonable predictive power. 
4.3. Checks of robustness and further tests 
4.3.1. Results from using an alternative control sample 
 We ran the model with an alternative sample that included 53 insurance observations and 
their two closest-size matched observations from the same industry and year. The sample size 
was 156 observations after dropping one observation for which the value for NLEND was 
missing and its two matched control observations. The new results are reported in Model 2.  
There are two notable changes in the results. First, the (positive) coefficient estimate of 
ASSTRAN*ISSUE now becomes statistically significant (p<0.05, 1-tail), implying that firms 
with more asset transactions with large non-tradable shareholders in the year following an 
equity issue are more likely to consider D&O insurance. As discussed in Section 3, such 
assets transactions are likely to be tunneling and so detrimental to minority shareholders. 
Therefore, this result provides further support for our hypothesis. 
Second, the (positive) coefficient estimates of HSHE and BSHE are now statistically 
significant (p<0.10, 1-tail). Therefore, firms with more shares listed in litigious overseas 
markets and/or firms having more foreign investors are more likely to consider D&O 
insurance. This result provides additional support to the litigation risk proxies. Otherwise, the 
results of Models 1 and 2 are comparable. Therefore, our main results are not sensitive to the 
use of a different control sample. 
 22
4.3.2. Market reactions to the announcement of D&O insurance decisions 
 In order to gauge how the market views a D&O insurance decision, we carried out an 
event study. For each D&O insurance approval contained in our insurance sample, we 
searched for the announcement in the minutes of the original board meeting. After screening 
out announcements associated with potentially confounding events20, we end up with 17 
clean announcements of D&O insurance proposals. The problem of a small sample size, 
however, is not uncommon in similar event studies. For example, Bhagat et al. (1987) used a 
sample of 11 announcements and found a positive and marginally significant market reaction 
to D&O insurance purchases for New York-based firms. Market model parameters are 
estimated using the 250 days preceding the examination period and are then used to calculate 
abnormal returns (AR) over the event window [0, +1] (Day 0 is the announcement day).  
 In unreported results, we find a positive but insignificant cumulative abnormal return for 
CAR (mean CAR = 2.8%, t-value = 1.22) for the two-day window. This result is broadly in 
line with the findings of Bhagat et al. (1987) and Brook and Rao (1994).21   
The small sample size prevents us from running a multivariate regression model using 
CARs. We thus compare mean CARs by two groups determined by the variables used in 
testing our major hypothesis, i.e., LARGEREP, ROE6_7, NLEND, CREDITG, 
TGDSV*ISSUE, and ASSTRAN*ISSUE, in order to see whether CAR is related to the 
extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts. 22  While most of these 
variables are, as expected, negatively correlated with CAR, i.e., the higher-than-median group 
has a lower mean CAR, only the t-test on the groups classified by ROE6_7 is statistically 
                                                        
20 The confounding events we screened out include earnings announcements, profit distributions, mergers 
and acquisitions, share issues, RPTs, asset write-downs, termination of investment projects, granting managers 
more decision power, etc. 
21 Brook and Rao (1994) investigated the stock price response to the adoption of liability limitation 
provisions using a sample of 120 US firms and find that the market appears to be indifferent to the event.  
22 For each continuous variable, we partition the sample into two groups (i.e., higher than or lower than the 
sample median of the test variable). 
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significant. Specifically, the mean CAR for the group ROE6_7 = 0 and 1 is 1.1% and -2.6%, 
respectively. The difference has a p-value of 0.022 (1-tail). This implies that the market reads 
the D&O insurance attempts in firms that may have engaged in earnings manipulation as 
being harmful. This provides supplementary evidence to our hypothesis that D&O insurance 
may be opportunistically purchased to protect the agents of controlling shareholders. The 
reason why only ROE6_7 bears a significant correlation with CARs is perhaps because ROE 
is a simple but closely watched indicator in China and it is also the key criterion for 
regulatory approval of equity issue.  
Interestingly, the mean CAR between the groups classified as LOCALSOE is also 
statistically significant (the mean CAR for the groups LOCALSOE = 0 and 1 is 1.8% and 
-0.4%, respectively; p-value = 0.06, 1-tail). This result is consistent with our previous 
argument that firms controlled by local governments are more likely to manage earnings 
and/or engage in tunneling RPTs than other firms and, not suprisingly, the market views the 
proposal to buy D&O insurance in such firms as negative news. This corroborates the 
findings of Cheung et al. (2006). 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines why some Chinese listed firms have recently decided to purchase 
D&O insurance. Chinese listed firms are of interest because they are plagued by controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders and there is a regulatory requirement 
that the purchase of D&O insurance needs to be approved by the shareholders’ meetings. We 
hypothesize that firms experiencing more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentive 
conflicts are more likely to consider purchasing D&O insurance than are other firms, because 
of the need to protect directors and managers from expropriation-related litigation risks. 
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Using a sample of 53 first-time approvals of D&O insurance purchases and a matched 
control sample, we found evidence supporting this hypothesis. Our results suggest that D&O 
insurance might be opportunistically purchased to protect company directors and managers 
against litigation risks arising from the expropriation of minority shareholders. The 
announcement of D&O insurance decisions seems to have a negative effect on shareholder 
wealth in firms that engage in earnings management and/or in firms controlled by local 
governments. As far as we are aware, the evidence we present on the effect of 
controlling-minority shareholder conflicts on the decision to purchase D&O insurance has not 
been previously documented in the literature. One policymaking implication of our results is 
that for the protection of minority shareholders, the CSRC may need to require the corporate 
purchase of D&O insurance be approved by a minimum proportion of minority shareholders. 
In addition, we found that the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively 
related to the proportion of independent directors on the board and several litigation risk 
proxies. It is interesting to note that these results (drawn from a jurisdiction that is relatively 
less litigious) are comparable to the findings of prior D&O insurance studies conducted in the 
West. One explanation is that the dynamic corporate governance and legal reforms in China 
(in particular, the recent breakthrough in private securities litigation law) have created a 
non-negligible level of perceived litigation risk.  
Our study represents an important first step towards understanding the implications of 
controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts for corporate D&O insurance decisions 
in China. Though we have adopted a matched control sample design, we note that our results 
are tempered by the small sample size and therefore should be interpreted with caution. 
Future studies would benefit from using data from other jurisdictions where 
controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are also important.  
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Table 1  
Variable definition 
Variable Exp. Sign Definition
INS  Taking 1 if a firm’s shareholder meeting has approved D&O insurance 
purchase for the first time and 0 if there is no such approval. 
LARGEREP + The proportion of directors being representatives of non-tradable 
shareholder.
ROE6_7 + Taking 1 if a firm’s reported return on equity is between 6-7% and 0 for 
otherwise.
NLEND + 
A listed firm’s net lending to non-tradable shareholders in year t, defined 
as (the amount of net lending to non-tradable shareholders at the end of 
year t ─ the amount of net lending to non-tradable shareholders at the end 
of year t-1) ÷ total assets at the end of year t. Net lending is the 
difference between the amount of money receivable from non-tradable 
shareholders minus the amount of money payable to non-tradable 
shareholders in a year-end.
CREDITG + 
A listed firm’s credit guarantee provided to non-tradable shareholders, 
defined as the year-end amount of credit guarantee provided by the listed 
company to non-tradable shareholders ÷ total assets.  
TGDSV +/- The amount of purchases and sales of goods and services between the 
listed firm and its non-tradable shareholders scaled by total assets.
ASSTRAN +/- The amount of purchases and sales of assets (other than goods and 
services, but including equity shareholdings) between the listed company 
and its non-tradable shareholders scaled by total assets. 
ISSUE +/- Taking 1 if there is an equity issue in the current and the previous year 
and 0 for otherwise.
TGDSV*ISSUE  + Denote for potential tunneling transactions of goods and services.
ASSTRAN*ISSUE + Denote for potential tunneling transactions of assets (including 
shareholdings).
IND + The proportion of independent directors on the board.  
VIOREC + A firm’s prior violation record, taking 1 if the firm has been subject to 
CSRC disciplinary actions, or the firm including its directors and 
managers received reprimands from stock exchanges in the prior year. 
LEV + Financial leverage, defined as the book value of total debt ÷ the book 
value of total assets. DLEV is a dummy variable with 1 denoting 
higher-than-sample-average leverage.
GROW + Growth opportunities, proxied by the market to book value ratio of a 
company. The ratio is calculated using the total number of shares and the 
tradable A-share price.
NUMACC + The natural log of the total number of shareholders.  
HSHE + The proportion of shares listed in overseas stock markets. 
BSHE + The proportion of domestically traded B-shares.  
RROA +/- Recurring profitability, defined as recurring net profit ÷ year-beginning 
book value of total assets. 
SIZE - Firm size, defined as the natural log of total assets.  
MAN +/- The number of shares owned by a company’s directors and managers ÷ 
total number of shares in issue.
REG + Regulatory status dummy, 1=regulated utilities 0 =otherwise.
CONTR + A measure of power of the largest shareholder, defined as log (the 
number of shares held by the largest shareholder ÷ the sum of the number 
of shares held by the second to the fifth largest shareholders). 
LOCALSOE +/- Taking 1 if a listed firm is controlled by a local government-controlled 
SOE and 0 for otherwise.
PRIVATE +/- Taking 1 if a listed firm is controlled by a private individual or firm and 
0 for otherwise.
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Table 2  
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Key descriptive statistics                 
Variables Mean Std Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95% N 
INS 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 106 
LARGEREP 0.46 0.24 0.00 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.88 106 
ROE6_7 0.085 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 106 
NLEND 0.015 0.472 -0.090 -0.014 0.000 0.029 0.156 105 
CREDITG 0.006 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 106 
TGDSV 0.118 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.118 0.750 106 
ASSTRAN 0.050 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.155 106 
ISSUE 0.10 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 106 
IND 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.33 106 
VIOREC 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 106 
LEV 0.48 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.44 0.59 0.79 106 
GROW 2.48 1.72 0.77 1.18 1.88 3.30 6.04 106 
NUMACC 10.68 0.93 8.93 10.04 10.81 11.30 12.12 106 
HSHE 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 106 
BSHE 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 106 
RROA 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.11 106 
SIZE 11.96 0.98 10.22 11.36 11.81 12.46 13.70 106 
MAN 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0010 106 
REG 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 106 
CONTR 1.75 1.77 -0.54 0.16 1.58 3.25 4.72 106 
LOCALSOE 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 106 
PRIVATE 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 106 
 
Panel B: Differences between the insurance and control sample 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Insurance Sample Control Sample 
t-stat Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
LARGEREP Insurance>Control 0.48 0.03 0.44 0.03 0.80 
NLEND Insurance>Control 0.03 0.09 0.001 0.01 0.29 
CREDITG Insurance>Control 0.01 0.005 0.002 0.001 1.57 c 
TGDSV +/- 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.04 -1.20 
ASSTRAN +/- 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 1.39 
TGDSV*ISSUE Insurance>Control 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.12 
ASSTRAN*ISSUE Insurance>Control 0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 0.0003 0.61 
IND Insurance>Control 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.02 1.83 b 
LEV Insurance>Control 0.54 0.06 0.43 0.02 1.66 b 
GROW Insurance>Control 2.50   0.24 2.49 1.66 0.02 
NUMACC Insurance>Control 10.69 0.14 10.64 0.12 0.29 
HSHE Insurance>Control 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.84 
BSHE Insurance>Control 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.56 c 
RROA +/- 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.63 
SIZE +/- 11.98 0.143 11.90 0.129 0.38 
MAN +/- 0.0030 0.0028 0.0003 0.001 0.97 
CONTR Insurance>Control 1.66 0.240 1.83 0.244 -0.49 
a,b,c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. One-tailed p-values are reported for uni-directional 
variables with predicted signs and two-tailed p-values are reported otherwise. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 3  
Multivariate results of the insurance probit model 
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Expectedsigns M.E. p-value M.E. p-value 
Proxies for shareholder incentive conflicts  
Proportion of large shareholder representatives 
on the board (LARGEREP) 
+ 0.57 0.02 b 0.50 0.01 a
Earnings management (ROE6_7) + 0.31 0.07 c 0.28 0.03 b
Tunneling proxies  
Net lending to large shareholders (NLEND) + 1.41 0.06 c 0.94 0.05 b
Credit guarantees to large shareholders 
(CREDITG) 
+ 7.57 0.01 a 5.18 0.00 a
The aggregate amount of goods and service 
RPTs (TGDSV) 
+/- -0.73 0.02 b -0.49 0.04 b
The amount of asset RPTs (ASSTRAN) +/- 2.35 0.07 c 1.78 0.03 b
Equity issue in the prior year (ISSUE) +/- -0.31 0.48 -0.21 0.33
TGDSV*ISSUE + 2.37 0.26 1.37 0.22
ASSTRAN*ISSUE + 14.0 0.16 16.8 0.03 b
Control variables  
Proportion of independent directors (IND) + 1.63 0.00 a 1.23 0.01 a
Litigation risk proxies  
Prior law violation (VIOREC) + 0.34 0.01 a 0.32 0.00 a
Leverage dummy (DLEV) + 0.33 0.02 b 0.15 0.07 c
Market-to-book value ratio (GROW) + 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.36
Log of number of shareholders (NUMACC) + 0.14 0.06 c 0.05 0.21
Proportion of shares listed overseas (HSHE) + 0.26 0.37 0.90 0.07 c
Proportion of B-shares (BSHE) + 0.86 0.11 0.64 0.09 c
Recurring profitability (RROA) +/- 2.05 0.09 c 2.52 0.00 a
Power of controlling owner (CONTR) + 0.02 0.28 0.03 0.18
Managerial ownership (MAN) +/- -44.5 0.80 -69.5 0.22
Regulated utilities dummy (REG) + -0.18 0.40 -0.10 0.50
Local government controlled firms 
(LOCALSOE) 
+/- -0.23 0.08 c -0.16 0.10 c
Private firm dummy (PRIVATE) +/- -0.70 0.02 b -0.41 0.02 b
Intercept +/- -2.32 0.03 b -1.33 0.06 c
Year dummies +/- Yes Yes 
McKelvey & Zavoina Pseudo-R2 0.85 0.72
Number of observations 104 156 
Notes:  
1. The dependent variable is INS, with 1 denoting a firm’s shareholders’ meeting has approved the purchase 
of D&O insurance. See Table 1 for details of variable definitions. M.E. means marginal effects. 
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in computing p-values. a,b,c = statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Reported p-values are one-tailed when uni-directional variables have predicted 
signs and two-tailed for otherwise.  
3. Model 1 uses the insurance sample and the one-to-one matched control sample. Model 2 used the 
insurance sample and the control sample comprising the two closet-size matched observations. The insurance 
observations with missing values on NLEND and their corresponding matched observations are deleted from 
the regression and so 2 (3) observations are dropped from Model 1 (2).  
